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ABSTRACT

PEACEKEEPING, PEACE ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OPERATIONAL ART by Major Daniel J. Schuster, USMC, 41 pages.

RESEARCH QUESTION: In the compression between tactics and strategy in peace operations, is there room for the operational art?

SUMMARY: Case studies of the 1982-1983 U.S. intervention in Beirut and the 1992-1993 U.S. intervention in Somalia are juxtaposed with the theoretical framework and tenets of the operational art as proposed by Dr. Schneider of the Army School of Advance Military Studies. This analysis explored the dynamics between tactical decisions and strategic objectives, sought to identify their unique challenges to the practice of the operational art, and proposed circumstances where the operational art would contribute to setting the conditions for military success. While recent U.S. experiences in Rwanda and Haiti were used occasionally to clarify particular issues, a distinction between the nature of these operations and those of Beirut and Somalia was delineated.

PEACEKEEPING, PEACE ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OPERATIONAL ART

A Monograph
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
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In the past twelve years, the U.S. military has been involved in two peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations in failed nation states with fractured and abundantly armed societies: Beirut, Lebanon and Somalia. Initial military actions were successful in both cases. Subsequently, however, the military efforts met defeat and recrimination. An analysis of these operations reveals that over time the initial military mission expanded and evolved to a point where taskings worked at cross purposes and fostered growing vulnerability in an increasingly hostile environment. The on-scene tactical commanders, responding to diverse objectives, were unable or unwilling to synchronize their efforts or to analyze the dynamics of the environment in order to prevent defeat.

The U.S. military has tended to treat peace operations as aberrations that elude the traditional practice of operational campaigning. Peace operations have been viewed as primarily high profile tactical evolutions complicated by the militarily ambiguous nature of the overall mission and the subordination of the military effort to political concerns. These complications seem to eschew the military's ability to mount a campaign with an operational focus, support it by operational analysis, and exercise unity of effort.

Peace operations, however, appear to demand the very benefits of operational campaigning that seem too difficult to practice. In the politically charged atmosphere of peace operations, even minor tactical decisions can have a disproportionately resounding strategic effect. Any significant tactical defeat will adversely affect the nation's overall effort to achieve its regional goals. To be successful, military actions

must be executed with prudence and in concert with other diplomatic efforts to serve a common goal. This effort requires a linkage of actions that is above tactical craft.

The lessons of Beirut and Somalia on how to better plan and execute such operations have an urgent relevance to the future. One such lesson may be that there is a need to modify our traditional views of operational campaigning to accommodate the unique challenges of peace operations.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE OPERATIONAL ART

An analysis of peace operations in the context of the operational art first requires a definition of what is meant by "operational art." Secondly, an analytical framework must be constructed to distinguish between various aspects of the term and to evaluate past efforts.

The U.S. Army defines the operational art as the coordination of the military effort through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of a military campaign that links separate tactical actions to achieve a strategic goal.¹ Central to its character is the distribution of military actions in terms of space and time. If a single military action in theater, a *coup de main*, can obtain the strategic goal, the operational art need not exist. Accordingly, the operational art emerges only when this single overwhelming action is not possible and the military force must pursue a series of successive and/or simultaneous actions in accordance with some central plan in order to obtain an ultimate goal.

Dr. James Schneider, at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies,

proposes that eight elements characterize the operational art which together comprise a theoretical framework for historical analysis of military campaigns. Schneider's framework is a convenience that allows for the examination of military actions from a variety of perspectives to determine how they contributed or failed to contribute to the essential linkage of tactical tasks to strategic objectives. Schneider proposes that in the operational art:

(1) Military actions comprise an ensemble of distributed actions extended in time and space but unified by a common aim to retain or deny freedom of action.

(2) Military actions focus not on a single objective but instead on several objectives within an opposing military system and ultimately achieve victory by causing the collapse of system support.

(3) Logistical support is derived from a formal system that provides continuous support of military actions instead of from a dependence on scavenging.

(4) The command and control structure is linked together with a reliable system that allows for rapid communication.

(5) Military forces are structured with an effective balance between independence of action and battlefield survivability.

(6) Military actions are focused with a common operational vision that is synergistic in nature.

(7) The opposing force must be generally symmetrical and arrayed in depth to preclude the opportunity for a single decisive engagement.

(8) Military actions must be supported by continuous mobilization.²

The existence of all eight of these elements distinguishes the practice of the operational art from tactical execution. Since each criteria will be later discussed individually in greater detail, suffice it to say now that this framework forms the bridge between tactical tasks and strategic purpose. If in conventional war the operational art is required but ignored, disaster is courted. The same criteria should also hold true for peace operations. If these elements must exist to define a conventional military operation, than these elements must also exist to define a peace operation.

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations are essentially third party interventions into multifaceted conflicts within an existing nation state or in an area disputed by nation states. The purpose of such operations is to monitor and enforce terms of an existing international agreement and thereby to create conditions for a diplomatic settlement.³

At first glance, peace operations indeed appear as an aberration of the military's *raison d'etre* which calls for the defense of the nation's interests. Even the term appears antithetical to traditional military practices, a perception reinforced by the grouping of such operations under the general heading of "operations other than war." Such distinctions between war and peace are academic, however, to the Marines and sailors who died in Beirut and to the soldiers who died in Mogadishu .

By their nature, peace operations flirt with the edge of open conflict; the transition from peace to war can be abrupt. However, in comparison to other military operations, a tactical defeat may also entail the defeat of the overall U.S. strategic effort. This

compression of tactics and strategy makes peace operations particularly difficult for military organizations. The margin for tactical error is small and the military mission can quickly be led astray by the shifting political dynamics of strategic diplomacy.

Whether peaceful or not, the U.S. is drawn into peace operations in an attempt to forestall escalation of a localized conflict and/or to promote regional stability. In either case, peace operations defend U.S. interests in direct or indirect manners and are therefore legitimate military missions despite their unconventional nature. The two forms of peace operations that seem to present the greatest challenge to the operational art are peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁴

PEACEKEEPING

Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, defines peacekeeping as "military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."⁵ Peace enforcement by contrast, involves punitive or coercive military actions or the threat of such actions conducted against a recalcitrant party and in support of diplomatic efforts to promote stability. If peacekeeping focuses on deterrence, peace enforcement focuses instead on forcibly countering and defeating the use of force by one or more belligerents.⁶

The operative concept for the use of military force in a peacekeeping operation is to maintain an interlude in hostilities of sufficient length to allow for the successful negotiation of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. An essential element in

accomplishing this task is an acceptance of the peacekeeping force as a neutral party by the respective belligerents. The endstate for the military operation is the successful monitoring and enforcing of the terms stipulated in its mandate. While military success is a stepchild of the overall diplomatic effort, a military failure can have a disproportionately adverse effect on this effort by undermining the will of the nations providing the peacekeeping force to continue their participation in the peace process.

It is crucial to recognize the particular nature of peacekeeping operations as distinct from more conventional operations. First, a "military solution" is not sought and the military endstate most probably will be merely to maintain the status quo. Second, nonmilitary people may make tactical decisions that have a profound effect on the operational environment. Third, the traditional military decision-making process must accommodate the perception of neutrality in even routine tactical decisions. Fourth, risk assessment and risk management must be synchronized with both force protection measures and diplomatic efforts. Lastly, indicators of the invalidity of operational assumptions, to include the perception of neutrality, must be identified and intelligence assets dedicated to collect and/or monitor these indicators.

When the peacekeeping force is perceived to have transitioned into a non-neutral position that distinctly favors a particular side in the conflict, its usefulness as a facilitator to a diplomatic solution comes to an end. The military force must either withdraw or drop the pretense of peacekeeping and become actively engaged in peace enforcement operations.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

A peace enforcement operation is defined by the US Army as the "application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore order.⁷ Peace enforcement tasks may include such actions as the forcible separation of belligerents, military support of the armed forces of the recognized government, or destruction by direct intervention of the combat capability of one or more belligerents.

In comparison to peacekeeping neutrality, peace enforcement involves the decisive and discriminate use of combatant forces actively engaged in military operations to defeat a hostile party. Success is determined by the timely and overwhelming application of force. Indiscriminate use of force would alienate the local population and increase popular resistance. Indecisive use of force may embolden belligerent's disruptive behavior and strengthen its political stature.

As with peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations are an adjunct to the diplomatic process. The pursuit of a military solution, however, may dominate the diplomatic process at least temporarily. Nonmilitary people may still make tactical decisions that deeply affect the military environment and military commanders must analyze these decisions as well as their own to determine their probable effect on both the military endstate and the basic assumptions underlying military planning.

Peace operations are distinguished not only by the military mission but also by the environment. Current U.S. peace operations in Haiti and Macedonia are distinctly different than those conducted in Lebanon, Somalia, and that contemplated for Bosnia. The former represent the lower spectrum of military risk. Military success is abetted by

the existence of an established and generally recognized national government and the control of violence is constabulary rather than military in nature. The latter instances entail higher risk because there is no effective national government that can bridge the ethnic, religious, and/or tribal schisms and violence is more prone to be military or paramilitary in nature.

These latter operations will be used to illustrate the challenges peace operations pose in the practice of the operational art because they present the greatest challenges and risks to military commanders and planners. Specifically, case studies of the 1982-1983 U.S. intervention in Beirut and the 1992-1993 U.S. intervention in Somalia will be juxtaposed with the theoretical framework of the operational art as proposed by Dr. Schneider. An exploration of the dynamics between tactical decisions and strategic objectives may clarify the circumstances where the operational art would contribute to setting the conditions for military success.

LINKING TACTICAL DYNAMICS TO A STRATEGIC AIM

The first criteria for the operational art is the linkage of an ensemble of military actions extended in space and time but unified by a common purpose. The operational challenges in both Beirut and Somalia were: determining what the military mission was in relation to the common aim at any particular time, who the opposing forces were at any particular time, and what the relative position of the military in relation to other instruments of national power was at any particular time.

TACTICAL MISSION VERSUS STRATEGIC AIM

The term "mission creep" has been popularized in military lexicon as meaning that over time the initial reason for military involvement in a particular operation undergoes expansive permutations as additional opportunities for a positive military influence in a diplomatic issue are perceived. The danger of mission creep lies in relating tasks to purpose. New tasks that creep into the military mission may be contrary to the initial purpose. Mission creep can be deliberate, as in Somalia, or apparently unnoticed, as in Beirut. In either case, mission creep needs to be aggressively managed by an operational commander in order to maintain a consistent focus.

The initial mission of the U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) deployed to Beirut in September 1982 was to assist the government of Lebanon in providing for its own security and to facilitate the withdrawal of other forces of occupation. This endstate was to be accomplished by the separation of the belligerent parties through the establishment of various buffer zones within Beirut and by a show of support for the fledgling national government through the presence of U.S. ground forces. There was a clear recognition at the onset that the maintenance of a perception of neutrality by the USMNF was critical to the peacekeeping mission.⁸

Over the course of the next twelve months, however, the USMNF mission crept from a position of neutrality to one of alignment. Within two months, the force was drawn into Lebanese politics by agreeing to actively train the enfeebled Lebanese Armed Force (LAF). While meant as a way to facilitate the Lebanese government's ability to provide for its own security, the demographics of the LAF heavily favored the Christian Phalange faction of the Lebanese society; the training program therefore alienated

Druze and various Moslem segments of the society. This alienation intensified six months later when the USMNF openly provided logistical support to LAF units engaged in intense fighting against Druze and Moslem militias. The USMNF lost all remaining pretense of neutrality when it further escalated its support of LAF units with naval gunfire.

Each of these new tasks tightened the bonds between the USMNF and the LAF and subjected the USMNF to increasingly hostile actions by Druze and Moslem militias: first sniper fire, then intermittent mortar fire, followed by artillery fire, and finally a suicide truck bombing of the USMNF headquarters at Beirut International Airport (BIA). Each event signaled both a decrease in the chances for successfully "peacekeeping" and an increase in force vulnerability.

The creeping expansion of military tasks to meet the strategic aim of buttressing the faltering Lebanese government violated the initial peacekeeping demands of neutrality. The initial mission statement for the USMNF that implied the purpose of the USMNF was to maintain a "visible but non-threatening posture" was never altered to accommodate additional taskings of peace enforcement.⁹ The tactics of the USMNF and the strategic aim became operationally separated as the USMNF missions crept along divergent axis. By October 1983, the USMNF was attempting to balance the requirements of two contradictory missions: to maintain a neutral peacekeeping presence and to provide overt support to LAF efforts to suppress opposing militias. Tactical tasks undertaken to accomplish these missions not only worked at cross purposes, but also undermined the peacekeeping precept of force neutrality.

Tactical tasks in Somalia, by comparison, violated the peace enforcement precept of decisive and discriminate action. Although mission creep in Somalia was managed (or at least recognized), the U.S. failure to acknowledge the growing futility of peace enforcement efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution led to a strategic defeat of U.S. regional policy objectives.

The initial mission of U.S. forces committed to Somalia was to provide security for the food shipment and distribution efforts of various international relief agencies attempting to alleviate mass starvation.¹⁰ This mission was successfully and formally completed within six months. With the United Nations (UN) assumption of a caretaker role in Somalia, the U.S. chose to participate in the UN efforts to rebuild the country's devastated infrastructure and to establish a democratic national government.¹¹ The new mission focused on both peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. The former entailed the deterrence of crime and inter-militia fighting. The latter involved logistical assistance.

The peacekeeping aspect of this UN nationbuilding mission abruptly transitioned to peace enforcement a month later when the U.S. endorsed UN Resolution 837 which demanded the arrest of Somali warlord General Aidid for allegedly authorizing the ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers, killing 24 soldiers.¹² From relief effort security, to nationbuilding, to military arrest, the U.S. peace operation in Somalia exemplified "managed" mission creep.

The frictions inherent in tactical actions, however, soon broached a strategic crisis. The U.S. efforts to arrest Aidid resulted in six successive highly publicized failures

which became increasingly indiscriminate in inflicting civilian casualties. If the tactical watchwords for peace enforcement are **decisive** and **discriminate**, at some point continuance of these raids became counterproductive to the strategic aim. Each failure to arrest Aidid bolstered his prestige and undermined that of the U.S. deployed forces. Each failure also marked a growing operational separation between the tactics employed and the strategic aim.

THREAT IDENTIFICATION

The second challenge for effectively linking tactical actions with a strategic aim is in determining who, if anyone or everyone, is the opposing force. Clausewitz noted that war is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."¹³ If peace operations risk the rapid transition into warfare, then a military force needs to be prepared for that circumstance should it arise. Accordingly, it is natural for a commander of a deployed force to continually assess the various forces proximate to his own for hostile intentions and the capability to inflict casualties. In peacekeeping, where neutrality is a dominant concern, veteran peacekeepers caution that all belligerents in a conflict are equally bad; to forget that fact risks losing the balance of impartiality required to be effective.¹⁴

In Beirut, the USMNF recognized that the LAF was dominated by the Christian Phalange. The U.S., however, was assured by the LAF leadership and the Lebanese government that reforms were being undertaken to correct this situation.¹⁵ Association with the LAF was based on the assumption that its forces would soon be embraced by the general populace as truly representative of all Lebanese interests. Regrettably, the reform effort faltered and the U.S. diplomatic effort was unable or unwilling to

recognize that support of the LAF risked the compromise of the USMNF's assumed neutrality.¹⁶ As a natural result of the teacher-student relationship formed with the LAF, the USMNF tacitly accepted the adage that "the enemy of my friend is my enemy." The Moslem and Druze militias quickly devolved into the opposing force and the U.S. endorsed the idea that their military defeat by the LAF would foster the strategic aim of a stable Lebanese government. The fact that this course of action conflicted with the continuing requirement for the USMNF to provide a visible, nonthreatening, and neutral presence was never articulated by military or civilian leadership. Tactical tasks to accomplish a strategic purpose negated the operational assumption of neutrality

In Somalia, various concerns drove the requirement for the U.S. lead in capturing Aidid. The debate regarding the degree of complicity General Aidid had in the ambush of the UN peacekeepers aside, the U.S. felt a strategic need to send a message that the era of lawlessness in Somalia had ended. Arresting Aidid would serve as a convenient way to send that message to the Somali people. Additionally, by participating in UN efforts to effect his arrest, the U.S. would also demonstrate to the world community its continuing support for an expanded UN role in the post-Cold War world. Tactical failure, however, risked defeating both of these strategic goals. Each successive failed attempt to arrest Aidid became increasingly strategically counterproductive as the U.S. invested more of its prestige. This continued investment without return increased the risk of an eventual bankruptcy of U.S. influence in the region. As in Beirut, the tactical actions negated the operational assumption that Aidid's arrest could be accomplished quickly.

MILITARY ROLE IN ACHIEVING SUCCESS

The last challenge regarding the tactical linkage to a strategic aim involves the relative positioning of the military vis-a-vis other national instruments of power. In Beirut, the "presence" mission was an adjunct to active negotiations to effect the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon. An earlier U.S. intervention had already removed the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanese territory. As the diplomatic effort stalled, various military "maneuvers" or expanded missions were perceived as viable means to open up diplomatic opportunities. Similarly, in Somalia, when negotiations for the formation of a national coalition government stalled over the issue of the degree of clan representation, Aidid's Habre Sidr clan lashed out against UN forces in Mogadishu that appeared to threaten Aidid's radio station. The UN response was military, not diplomatic, and preempted further diplomatic efforts to resolve the base issue of parliamentary representation. Following the failure of numerous efforts to forcibly overthrow Aidid, both President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher decided that the U.S. was relying too heavily on seeking a military solution to a diplomatic problem.¹⁷ This was a week prior to the disastrous 3 October 1993 sixth attempt to arrest Aidid that left hundreds of Somalis and eighteen U.S. soldiers dead.

Additionally, it is a natural dynamic of the military culture to abhor inaction and to seek to lead in whatever endeavor in which it is involved. In Beirut, the on-scene commander welcomed the opportunity to train the LAF because it held not only the promise of hastening the end Lebanese instability but it also provided an outlet for Marines bored with the routine of patrolling buffer zones.¹⁸ In Somalia, the Joint

Special Operations Command welcomed the opportunity to demonstrate its prowess in the surgical operations that were its justification for existence. However, in assuming the lead to create opportunities for diplomatic advancement, the military also assumes a host of added responsibilities, to include, the synchronization of any additional tasks it assumes with the strategic purpose. Management of these tactical dynamics is an operational function.

In both Beirut and Somalia, the cumulative effect of tactical shortfalls over time increased the risk of strategic failure. The operational art requires a linkage of tactical tasks and strategic purpose. Without this linkage, the military forces were unable to coordinate separate tactical actions in time and space in order to obtain a strategic goal. Neither the tactical commanders nor the strategic planners were prepared to manage mission creep (in the case of Beirut), identify the nature of the opposition, or balance the role of the military with that of other instruments of national power in solving the crisis.

LINKING MULTIPLE TASKS TO ACHIEVE A COMMON PURPOSE

The second criteria for the operational art requires the military effort use the means at hand to pursue multiple ways to obtain the strategic end. The synergy of multiple military actions progressively undermines the support structure of an opposing force and eventually causes its collapse. In peace operations, the challenge is to keep not only the diplomatic and military efforts "in sync," but to also keep the various military efforts pulling together rather than apart.

The problems associated with mission creep in Beirut were compounded by the multiplicity of tactical decisions that focused on increasingly divergent missions. These decisions inadvertently and adversely affected both the assumption of force neutrality and the balance between force protection and presence. The USMNF took two routes towards achieving the goal of the establishment of a stable Lebanese government. The first route was to strengthen the LAF so it could enforce governmental dictates. The second route was to use presence to deter hostility and facilitate the return to preconflict normalcy.

Four tactical decisions exemplify the challenges of coordinating these actions. The first two affected the USMNF slide from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as it sought to support the LAF. The second two demonstrate the erosion of ground forces usefulness in maintaining peace through presence.

As noted earlier, by actively training the LAF the USMNF had inadvertently aligned itself with the Phalange. This perception was reinforced by a tactical decision regarding the nature and location of the training. Formerly, LAF training was covertly conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces teams at various LAF camps throughout Beirut. In comparison, apparently for convenience, the USMNF chose to conduct its LAF training program at a LAF camp within the USMNF perimeter at BIA, irrespective of the likely negative repercussions on force neutrality.¹⁹ Additionally, the training included such high visibility events as artillery and armor tactics and helicopter operations that included mock vertical assaults and helicopter extractions. The appearance of close association with the Phalange was further reinforced by the coincidental supply of

thirty-two M-48 tanks to the LAF by the U.S. State Department.²⁰

While the later open logistical support of the LAF in combat further eroded the validity of any claims to neutrality, the active combat support provided to the LAF clearly marked a U.S. transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. This decision was made by President Reagan on the advice of Middle East envoy McFarland over the objections of tactical military leaders. It involved the use of naval gunfire in direct support of the LAF engaged in defending the Suq-Al-Gharb district above Beirut from Moslem and Druze militia attack.²¹ While the decision was soundly grounded in the need to prevent the defeat of the newly reorganized, trained, and equipped LAF by Syrian-supported militias and the need to demonstrate U.S. resolve in order to secure a withdrawal of Syrian forces, it committed the U.S. to a peace enforcement role. The USMNF at BIA, however, was not informed of the mission change, if indeed anyone recognized that the mission of the USMNF had changed. While there is no clear evidence of a linkage between combat support of the LAF and the bombing attack on the USMNF a month later, a congressional commission later convened to investigate the attack, the "Long Commission," concluded that such a cause and effect was likely.²²

Two key decisions also marked the steady erosion of the USMNF usefulness in creating stability by "presence." The first decision was really an acceptance of the restrictions of the "peacetime" ROE imposed on the USMNF at BIA even when faced with open hostility. This acceptance was based on two assumptions: first, that the LAF could provide timely and effective action to neutralize significant threats to the USMNF;²³ secondly, that an aggressive response to hostile action would result in

civilian casualties that would both alienate the local population and serve to fuel anti-American propaganda.

The USMNF experience in Beirut quickly demonstrated that the LAF was ineffective in providing the force with constabulary services. This assumption underwrote the initial rationale for the restrictive ROE imposed on the force and was an essential criteria for success in the presence mission. Although in the first six months of duty the USMNF at BIA was not the target of any hostile action, the USMNF commander realized that *de facto* force protection was accomplished by Israeli occupation of the districts immediately adjacent to the USMNF sector.²⁴ When the Israelis abruptly withdrew their forces from this district and it came under the nominal control of the LAF, the USMNF was subjected to first sniper fire then mortar fire originating from the area.

In response to this fire, the ROE allowed for retaliatory fire only commensurate with that received in order to suppress further fires. This circumstance allowed for incongruous situation where snipers could fire on USMNF positions along the BIA perimeter until they ran out of ammunition then saunter unarmed out of the building housing their position without fear of being fired upon.²⁵ Active defensive measures like aggressive USMNF patrolling in these areas was not allowed for fear of escalating the conflict. The USMNF commander accepted these restrictions and instead pursued passive defensive measures that included hardening perimeter positions and billeting noncombat personnel in the concrete and steel multi-storied headquarters building which afforded its occupants protection from sniper and artillery fire.²⁶ The end result

of this pursuit of a passive defense was to relinquish the initiative to increasingly hostile and aggressive militias. Presence became synonymous not with stability but with vulnerability.

The second decision relating to the eroding influence of the USMNF ground forces occurred seven weeks prior to the catastrophic bombing attack on 23 October 1983. Following the death of several Marines in various sniper and artillery attacks, the USMNF commander suspended Marine patrols outside of BIA except as necessary to provide security to the U.S. Embassy. Without patrols, the USMNF relinquished its ability to promote a stable environment in Beirut beyond the airport perimeter and acceded that it could no longer perform its peacekeeping mission.

These various tactical decisions hastened the transition of the USMNF from peacekeeping to peace enforcement without a coordinated adjustment in tactics or procedures that would retain the operational initiative. Tactical synergy was lost and actions, instead of complimenting, contradicted each other. The apparent failure to manage or even to recognize the transition made the USMNF operationally unprepared for this new mission and therefore vulnerable.

Comparatively, in Somalia the U.S. force pursued a carrot and stick approach that clearly recognized the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The operational challenges were in linking how much effort should be dedicated to each task and with their deconfliction to achieve the strategic purpose of establishing a stable democratic Somalia. Following the UN relief of the U.S. led multinational coalition effort, efficient management of the U.S. effort was frustrated by the contradictory

missions pursued at different levels in the chain of command.

Per UN Resolution 814, the U.S. provided 8,000 military logistical personnel to rebuild the Somali infrastructure and an army light brigade of 1,700 troops to act as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to protect the UN peacekeeping force. This force was under the command of U.S. Army Major General Montgomery who was also assigned as the Deputy Force Commander for all UN forces in Somalia.²⁷ Montgomery's charge was to conduct nationbuilding operations as an adjunct to peacekeeping and to maintain a positive posture with the Somali people at large both within and outside Mogadishu. Within Mogadishu, he had to reassure the Somali clans, earlier disarmed by U.S. forces at the urging of the UN, that the U.S. would continue to honor its commitment to protect them. This action was made the more difficult when numerous innocent Somalis were killed in the clashes between Aidid and UN forces.

Meanwhile, U.S. Army Major General Garrison was in Mogadishu leading a U.S. special operations task force named Task Force Ranger which was attempting to capture Aidid and his senior lieutenants.²⁸ Although initial efforts were planned as covert surgical operations that minimized casualties, the need for additional firepower and the acceptance of "collateral damage" in the form of civilian casualties soon became apparent.

Lastly, General Hoar, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, was being pressured to reduce the U.S. combat presence in Somalia. Both he and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, had expressed skepticism about General Garrison's mission from the onset.²⁹

The divergent aims of Montgomery, Garrison, and Hoar served to limit the peace enforcement mission to one of an economy of force that would use a limited number of American troops restricted by a need to minimize collateral damage. This force would require either precision firepower or surprise to reduce its vulnerability. Neither of these criteria would be realized. On 14 September, Montgomery requested that the QRF, which had pursued its own limited attempts to capture Aidid before the arrival of Garrison, be provided a number of tanks and armored fighting vehicles to give his force of light wheeled vehicles a "barrier breaking" capability. This request was denied by administrators in the office of the Secretary of Defense who were more concerned with disengaging the QRF from Somalia and reducing the UN's reliance on the force.³⁰ In the failed 3 October raid, the lack of U.S. armor forced Task Force Ranger to call for a combined Pakistani-Malaysian armored force to belatedly rescue encircled and embattled U.S. soldiers.³¹

General Garrison's request for AC-130 gunships prior to the 3 October raid was similarly denied by General Hoar on the advisement of Mr. Wisner, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. General Garrison desired to have the gunships as a means to intimidate the Somalis, not necessarily as a fire support platform for future raids. Nevertheless, General Hoar believed that the task force helicopters provided sufficient firepower for a raid force and that AC-130 gunships would serve only to enlarge the U.S. presence in Somalia, not to mention increasing the danger of inadvertent civilian casualties if they in fact were used.³²

Lastly, the tactical decision to "go to the well" one more time with the basic plan of

inserting a raid force by helicopter, extracting the force through a link up with a ground convoy of wheeled vehicles, and maintaining a reserve drawn from the QRF's motorized forces assumed that Aidid's forces did not have the capability to counter what was now a familiar sequence of events.³³ The tactical analysis associated with continuing this particular course of action apparently did not determine the point beyond which the risk of continued failure gambled with strategic defeat.

In both Beirut and Somalia, there was no operational linkage to coordinate the tactical efforts which were directed along different routes in order to achieve a strategic synergy. To the contrary, over time the various missions and associated tasks pulled the operations apart, leading to force protection vulnerabilities that could and were exploited by those who would benefit by a U.S. defeat.

DEVELOPING A UNITY OF COMMAND

The third factor in the operational art equation is that the command and control structure be structured in a manner that allows for rapid communication. If command assigns responsibility for success or failure then control assigns authority to direct such actions to achieve success. In Beirut, the operational challenge was one of command. In Somalia, the operational challenge was one of control.

At the time of the bombing attack on the USMNF Headquarters at BIA, the Long Commission concluded it was "abundantly clear" that the operational environment of the USMNF was no longer permissive and "that appropriate guidance and modification of taskings should have been provided to the USMNF to enable it to cope effectively

with the increasingly hostile environment. The Commission could find no evidence that such guidance was in fact provided."³⁴ The Long Commission laid the blame for this lack of direction and analysis on the excessive layering of command where each level assumed the next senior or junior level was responsible for conducting periodic reassessments of the operational environment. The end result is that no one assumed this responsibility, conducted an analysis of the operational dynamics, and directed that appropriate force protection measures be undertaken which may have included a partial force withdrawal. Although in hindsight this last action would have been the most prudent, at the time such action may have been construed as tantamount to a declaration of a failure to maintain stability through "presence.". No one in the chain of command appeared willing to associate themselves with such an action. Accordingly, each layer of command made the optimistic assumption that someone else was really in charge and would take whatever action was necessary to ensure that the peacekeeping force was not unduly at risk. There were tactical commanders and strategic commanders, but no operational commanders. An operational commander would have been responsible for the analysis and modification of actions alluded to by the Long Commission.

In Somalia, the issue was not of who was in command but of who was in control of the peace enforcement operation. As noted earlier, Major General Garrison had command of Task Force Ranger but his control was limited to special forces. His failed attempts to modify that force structure indicate the limits of his control to adjust force structure to a changing environment. But if the seeds of disaster can be found in this centralization of force structure control at the strategic level, the failed 3 October raid

can also be blamed on the decentralized control of tactical execution.

The authority to launch a raid was vested in the on-scene commander, Major General Garrison, without the need to consult with Washington. This allowed Garrison to act on the fleeting intelligence on Aidid's whereabouts in a timely manner. After the failure of the fifth raid to capture Aidid, the administration reviewed its policy of using force to broker a peace in Somalia. The decision to cancel further attempts to arrest Aidid was made in a meeting between President Clinton and the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali on 27 September 1993.³⁵ This decision, however, was not instantly relayed to the UN command in Somalia or General Garrison. When news of the failed raid reached Washington, Secretary of State Christopher expressed surprise that the raid had even occurred.³⁶ The President, when informed of the disaster, asked "Why did they launch the raid?"³⁷ The attempt to free the tactical commander from micromanagement, without a viable control structure to accommodate mission changes, in effect separated the continuing military effort from the political objective.

In Somalia, these twin control issues of centralized control of force structure and decentralized control of execution contributed to tactical defeat. In Beirut, the lack of a responsible commander contributed to tactical defeat. Unity of command needs to invest one commander with the authority to command and control. In peace operations, this commander needs to link the tactical actions of subordinates with strategic objectives that frequently evolve in response to new opportunities or failed diplomatic efforts. This link must be responsible for not only continual situational assessments but also for directing feasible, suitable, and acceptable actions to achieve mission success.

BALANCING MANEUVER AND FORCE PROTECTION

The fourth element of the operational framework is that the military force must effectively balance its requirements for independence of action with those of battlefield survivability. This balance must prevent the defeat of the force by a *coup de main* while simultaneously allowing the force to operate in such a manner as to place the opposing force at a disadvantage. In peace operations, this balance translates to maximizing force protection and minimizing the opportunity of forces opposed to the peace process to secure an advantage by military action. In Beirut and Mogadishu, the peace forces were tactically surprised by an opposing military force and as a result suffered significant force attrition. Operationally, the initiative for independent action was relinquished to an opposition much less concerned with casualties.

The bombing attack on the U.S. Embassy in April 1983 initiated the first review of the original analysis that determined the appropriate balance between force protection and the tactical actions deemed necessary to establish a viable U.S. presence in Beirut. At issue was the degree to which the USMNF peacekeeping posture was threatened. The degree of threat would then determine if any changes should be made to the ROE currently in effect. An analysis of the event by USCINCEUR assumed that the embassy bombing was an isolated incident and that while the diplomatic offices of the U.S. might be threatened, the USMNF at BIA was a distinctly separate entity and less vulnerable to being a target of opportunity.³⁸ Accordingly, the USMNF peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) were modified only for those Marines providing security for the U.S. Embassy and did not include other USMNF personnel. At the embassy, a less

restrictive definition of the term "hostile act" was allowed which in turn provided for greater flexibility in the use of retaliatory force conducted self defense.

The peacetime mindset at BIA was reinforced by a separate coincidental action. In order to minimize the danger of an incident caused by an inadvertent casualty from an "accidental discharge" (the firing of a weapon without specific intent), the ground force commander ordered the removal of magazines from individual weapons except when posted on security duty.³⁹ While in retrospect these twin decisions regarding ROE and weapons safety made the USMNF more vulnerable in a time of increasing hostility, the force commander noted at the time that "in spite of the terrorist threat, we are continuing to maintain a proper balance between security and our presence/peacekeeping mission."

By late August 1983, the U.S. mission had *de facto* transitioned to peace enforcement and the ground force was under increasing attack by hostile militias. The USMNF commander, however, was still burdened with the missions of keeping BIA open to public use and with maintaining a nonthreatening defensive posture.⁴⁰ The balance struck between force protection and public access included the central billeting of all noncombat personnel in the perceived safety of the headquarters building and the use of light barriers and a single guard to restrict access and to prevent the introduction of a parked car bomb similar to that used several months earlier at the U.S. Embassy. The threat of a kamikaze attack with a truck laden with explosives was not envisioned.

This dependence on the passive defense gave greater weight to **presence** then **force protection**. The analysis that drove this balance appears not to have defined the factors distinguishing a permissive and non-permissive environment. The initial JCS alert

order that formed the USMNF stipulated that USCINCEUR would withdraw the ground force in the event of "hostile action."⁴¹ Apparently, however, the sniper and artillery fire heretofore directed at those forces did not cross the threshold that would allow for even a partial withdrawal of ground forces to ships offshore. Mission success for peacekeeping at the tactical and strategic levels demanded a permissive environment or at least the appearance of one. In the end, bad tactics appeared to be good strategically. An operational analysis taking a broader view than the tactical level and a narrower view than the strategic level might have weighted the balance differently.

In Somalia, a different dynamic drove the balance between force protection and risk acceptance. Once Task Force Ranger deployed to Mogadishu, U.S. credibility was tied to mission success and that success was defined by Aidid's capture. The failure of two, four, or five missions would be forgotten if the last mission was successful. Yet no one appears to have designated a "limit of advance" that would have signaled when the costs of failed efforts to capture Aidid had surpassed the comparative diplomatic benefit of his arrest. Major General Garrison, as a tactical commander, had no alternative but to continue his mission until informed to do otherwise. The chances of success, however, diminished with each failure as surprise gave way to anticipation and the force structure remained unchanged.

Although the tactical defeats of 23 October 1983 and 3 October 1993 did not precipitate the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, there is no doubt that they were watershed events in forcing U.S. disengagement from a position of diplomatic weakness. In both cases, the forces were tactically surprised because of an operational

lack of balance. This lack of balance was further exacerbated by the fact that the vulnerability to attrition was not compensated for by actions to retain the initiative (or Schneider's reference to "the achievement of a superior position of maneuver"). In both cases, the U.S. force was in the unenviable position of being both outmaneuvered and vulnerable.

MAINTAINING A COMMON AND SYNERGISTIC VISION

The fifth factor that defines the operational art is the requirement that military actions be focused towards a common operational vision that is synergistic in nature. In both Beirut and Somalia, individual military actions were either tactically or strategically sound, but not both. Instead of building synergy, the lack of a common vision and of an accurate evaluation of the impact of separate military actions on key operational assumptions increasingly risked failure

Success for the USMNF in Beirut was based on four assumptions: that the force operate in a permissive environment; that the LAF provide for the security of the force; that the mission be of limited duration; and that the force would be evacuated in the event of an attack. In the period between the arrival of the USMNF in Beirut and the bombing attack, the first two assumptions had been compromised, the third assumption was in doubt, and the fourth not executed.⁴² The principle causes for these changes were attributed to the loss of perceived USMNF neutrality due to increasingly active support of the LAF, the opportunity for Syria and Iran to further their anti-American agendas by supporting militia factions attacking the USMNF, and by the failure of

diplomatic efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of third party forces occupying Lebanon.⁴³

The fourth assumption was dependent on a definition of what constituted an attack and when no one chose to set conditions that would initiate a withdrawal under pressure, it too became invalid.

Four decisive points mark the path along which these assumptions were violated and where tactics diverged from strategy. These points sequentially include the decision for USMNF training of the LAF, the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut, the U.S. Embassy bombing, and the twin actions of supporting the LAF first logistically then with indirect fire. The dynamics of each of these instances in relation to the mission, force neutrality, and force protection have been discussed previously. Each of these points was clouded by the background noise of a politically charged atmosphere; yet each marked a significant action or event that required a complete review of tasks, purposes, and vulnerabilities. It is not clear who, if anyone, conducted such reviews. If even one such review had been completed, perhaps the lack of operational synergy might have been divined.

In a situation analogous to Beirut, tactical actions taken in Somalia supported strategic objectives that were diametrically opposed to each other and which violated basic operational assumptions.

Mission success for Garrison's peace enforcement actions was based on several assumptions. First, that the U.S. had the intelligence apparatus in place that would be sufficient to locate Aidid, preferably at night when U.S. forces could use the advantages provided by superior night vision capability. Secondly, that the operation leading to his

arrest would be covert, rapid, and surgical. Lastly, that the force as deployed was sufficient to accomplish the mission.

The death of the prime human intelligence source on Aidid's whereabouts and the hesitancy of other informers to venture into the Habre Gadir clan's district after dark invalidated the first assumption.⁴⁴ The U.S. executed most raids, including the 3 October 1993 raid, in daylight when people thronged the streets. Between 30 August and 3 October 1993 the highly publicized failures of six attempts to capture Aidid invalidated the second assumption. Lastly, the constraints that capped force structure changes invalidated the last operational assumption. With this cap, the force could no longer accommodate the loss of tactical surprise with an increase in firepower.

Keeping an operational focus and developing tactical synergy proved to be too great a challenge for the military efforts in Beirut and Mogadishu. Over time events demonstrated the invalidity of initial planning assumptions. Without an operational perspective, however, there was no direction provided to subordinates that adjusted tactical actions to accommodate the changing environment and there was no analysis provided to seniors at critical decisive points that compared purpose and tasks.

LOSING THE ASYMMETRICAL ADVANTAGE

The sixth distinguishing factor of the operational art is that the forces opposing one another must be generally symmetrical or similar in relative combat power. Without symmetry, one force can overwhelm the other in a single decisive engagement. Even though the U.S. is the world's only superpower and by definition asymmetrical, in peace

operations a range of political and social factors restrain the unmitigated exercise of the nation's military might. The futility of "destroying the village in order to save it" is generally recognized by those charged with promoting peace, democracy, and American values. In addition, while U.S. forces deployed on peace operations are the best equipped and trained forces in the world and the hostile factions in opposition are generally loosely organized militias with limited armament, four factors lend themselves to making these forces symmetrical; urban terrain, intelligence, ROE, and national will.

In Beirut, the urban terrain proved to be a force equalizer in several ways. USMNF efforts to dominate their environment by patrols and checkpoints did little to restrict the maneuver and resupply of various opposing militias. Not only did alleys and sidestreets allowed Druze and Moslem militias to bypass USMNF patrols and checkpoints along major thoroughfares, but the division of city into ghettos that were "home" to these militias frustrated even the most aggressive patrolling program. Militia men could melt away until a patrol passed, supported by a population that was either sympathetic to or frightened of the militia. Additionally, the cover and concealment afforded by a built-up area teaming with innocent civilians negated the advantages provided by superior weaponry. When Druze artillery fired on USMNF positions at BIA, counterfire by U.S. artillery and naval gunfire proved to be indiscriminate in causing damage. Both the death of civilians from "friendly" fire and the inability of USMNF or LAF to establish a full time presence in local neighborhoods seriously undermined their credibility as an effective force for peace.

A lack of intelligence also proved to be a force equalizer. While the USMNF had access to high tech national intelligence gathering assets, electronic sensing and satellite imagery is of limited use against a force with minimal electronics and concealed in urban terrain. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is the prime source for gathering intelligence on possible opposition forces. Religious and tribal divisions make it a difficult task for an intervening force to gather HUMINT information on its own accord; that garnered from paid informers is dubious and often contradictory. The result in Beirut was a flood of **information** but little **intelligence** of military value. Local forces, however, find it relatively easy to gather intelligence about the actions and intentions of foreign peacekeepers who employ local inhabitants for a variety of services and are easily distinguishable from the indigenous population.

ROE also balances the force ratios between nominally superior and inferior forces. Peace forces are constrained by self imposed restrictions on their application of force in order to prevent collateral damage. Through observation and testing, an opposing force can quickly discover where the limits of authority lie in the use of force. In Beirut, this discovery allowed hostile snipers to freely move to and from their firing positions without fear of retaliation. The advantage then seems to be with the force that has no compunction about causing collateral damage and is able to either stop short of precipitating retaliation or is able to manipulate retaliation to its advantage through propaganda.

Lastly, the media serves to equalize asymmetrical forces. Media coverage depends on access and an audience. The greatest access is to the intervening forces of a peace

operation and the audience is the domestic populations of the countries providing the peace force. Peace operations are vulnerable to negative media coverage since they are dependent on the domestic will of the participating nations to provide an intervention forces in a conflict. Since the conflict does not have a direct relationship with national self-defense, a national consensus is difficult to maintain and can be swayed by a downward turn of events. Accordingly, a peace force is much more vulnerable to adverse news coverage than an opposition force whose supporting population probably doesn't have access to CNN and who may also directly benefit from the failure of the peace mission.

These four factors characterize the environment of peace operations and, if not compensated for, may relinquish the advantages of asymmetry to forces in opposition to the peace process. The operational challenge is to coordinate military actions to seize and retain the initiative and to limit an opposition's ability to take advantage of these vulnerabilities.

COORDINATING LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Formal logistical support for deployed forces forms the sixth requirement for the operational art. An ability to sustain forces committed to maneuver or to defense is an essential basis for any operational plan. The basic requirements of food, water, and shelter aside, the maintenance and ammunition needs of any modern force, especially the mechanized, motorized, and firepower intensive ground forces of the U.S., preclude an ability to live off the land. Given that U.S. forces are designed to project force

anywhere in the world, the U.S. has developed an unmatched lift and support capability. This ability to sustain military actions around the globe for an indefinite period has also become the hook for a U.S. lead in many peace operations. No other military force can do what the U.S. can.

U.S. involvement in various peace operations is based at least in part if not mostly on the feasibility of U.S. sustainment of the force ashore. Both Beirut and Mogadishu are coastal ports that allowed the U.S. to deploy and sustain the forces from the sea. This geographical consideration also protected their lines of supply from interdiction since no rival military or paramilitary force had the capability to challenge U.S. seapower.

Future peace operations, however, may not afford the luxury unassailable lines of supply. The U.S. humanitarian relief effort in Rwanda, for example, taxed the limited capabilities of local airfields. The alternative use of ground transportation to carry relief supplies from the African coast to the interior was considered but discarded as impractical. The routes were long, torturous, and insecure. Had the operation required a peacekeeping force, the burden on U.S. lift capability would have tremendous.

With the U.S. military drawdown, lift and sustainment capability has dramatically decreased in recent years. The primary purpose of these forces is to sustain combat forces committed into one or two major regional conflicts. With fewer support forces available, there will be a need to husband these precious resources in future peace operations.

The obvious alternative is to contract civilian firms to provide logistical support as in Operation Desert Storm when the U.S. depended on host nation support for fuel, food,

water, and transportation needs. The areas to which peace forces are deployed, however, probably won't have the infrastructure to support such a solution. In the foreseeable future there will be a growing urgency for an operational commander both to champion the tactical commanders' requests for strategic support and to oversee allocation of limited resources.

DETERMINING THE COSTS IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AND TIME

The final element of the operational art is the need for continuous mobilization to support the military effort. In the conventional sense, this requirement ensures that a military force can not be destroyed in a single engagement; if defeated, it can withdraw and reconstitute. The theoretical assumption is that mobilization provides a military force an extensive manpower pool from which to draw. In application to peace operations, the concept can be modified somewhat to mean that the peace force is backed by a national will that will commit sufficient manpower resources to conduct operations for the required period.

Theoretically, before committing to a peace operation, the U.S. first comes to a consensus relating the anticipated costs of the operation in terms of time, blood, and treasure to the expected benefits in terms of promoting national values and perhaps in precluding greater eventual costs if the issue remains unresolved or escalates. This cost-benefit analysis places a value on the operation. This value is called into question each time there is a requirement for a greater investment, especially if a return on previous investments is not realized. The loss of life during the BIA bombing attack or

the failed sixth raid to capture Aidid did not in themselves cause the failure of the U.S. military effort. These losses were the straws that broke the proverbial camel's back, a back already burdened by a lack of return in a national investment in blood, treasure, and prestige and by a forlorn hope that the future held any promise for further payoff.

It is not a military responsibility to determine the value of participating in any particular crisis. The prudent commander, however, is attuned to what costs the nation is willing to bear. It is axiomatic to say that the American public and its military want every peace operation resolved quickly, bloodlessly, and with a minimal investment in manpower and money. In achieving this desire, however, the U.S. may sacrifice an enduring solution to the crisis. The failed operations in both Beirut and Somalia followed the successful application of military force to achieve limited goals: in Beirut it was the removal of the PLO from the city; in Somalia it was the end of mass starvation. Although successful, these operations appeared to only whet the U.S. desire to do more with a longer lasting effect.

The operational challenge of a broader military mission is the identification of the subjective factors that would indicate culmination of national will. How many troops can be deployed and for how long? How many casualties can be sustained? How much force can be applied? The answers to these questions would serve to shape the compromises that need to be made between force protection, maneuver, force structure, and firepower at critical junctures in an operation.

ACHIEVING SUCCESS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

When viewed from the eight perspectives afforded by Dr. Schneider's framework for the operational art, the strategic shortfalls of the military tactics applied in Beirut and Mogadishu are apparent. In both operations:

- * Tactical dynamics forced a wedge between tasks and strategic objectives;
- * A lack of coordination between separate efforts seeking to achieve the strategic aim fostered actions that worked at cross purposes;
- * No one commander had both the authority and responsibility to provide a unity of purpose and effort;
- * In balancing military action against the requirements for force protection, no analysis discerned that bad tactics, while appearing to support a good strategy, in fact were based upon questionable assumptions about the operational environment;
- * Without a synergistic operational vision to focus the military effort, individual actions were either tactically sound or strategically sound but not both;
- * The technological advantages of the U.S. military were effectively nullified by an inferior force operating in familiar urban terrain, unencumbered with ROE, and supported by a population without access to western media;
- * Though logistical lines of communication were secured by seapower, less opportune terrain would have made sustainment by air and ground transportation difficult and vulnerable; and
- * The value of the operation was called into question when military efforts to force conflict resolution were thwarted and the costs of continuing the operation with little hope for future success exceeded any benefits that would be eventually realized.

The military defeats in these two operations were not the result of a lack of tactical skill on the part of the individual troops or a lack of strategic initiative on the part of senior commanders. These defeats were largely a result of a lack of planning and leadership at the operational level where the application of ways and means to achieve an end could not be achieved by a *coup de main* but required a sequence of military actions. This extension of planning over time, at least in the case of peace operations, may require a level of acumen to which our commanders and staff are not trained.

If success is to be achieved in future Lebanons and Somalias, our military leadership needs to develop the skill to apply the requirements of operational focus, unity of effort, and analysis to peace operations. Peace operations are different than conventional operations, but they are not so different in nature or in service to our nation's defense interests that they need be treated as aberrations. They are, however, different enough from traditional military actions that to be successful, a commander and staff must develop specialized skills to overcome the frictions that accompany each operation and threaten failure if left unattended.

If a peace operation is to achieve success, an operational commander and staff must be able to deal with ambiguity. Military training and organizations use the objective language of precision to clearly define what needs to be done when and by whom. Politicians, on the other hand, use the subjective language of diplomacy that seeks to find compromise and opportunity. One language is that of black and white, one is of greys. In peace operations, more so than for traditional operations, the initial black and white quickly devolves to grey.

In this greyness - this compression between the need for precise tactical translation of strategic searches for diplomatic opportunity - a single operational commander and staff, not found in Beirut and Mogadishu, would serve as the necessary bridge between task and purpose. Such an organization:

- * Could provide the analysis to translate the strategic into the tactical;
- * Deconflict multiple efforts that could potentially work at cross purposes;
- * Provide a single point of responsibility and authority;
- * Continuously evaluate the balance between maneuver and force protection;
- * Set the tempo and retain the initiative by coordinating the application of force in terms of time, space, and effort;
- * Set and adjust military endstates and sequence events to foster the transition from the military to the constabulary; and
- * Recognize operational assumptions and the decision points which would require their reevaluation.

If future peace operations are to achieve success, a single commander - an operational commander - is needed to focus the military effort, synchronize that effort within the military and deconflict it with other forces in multilateral operations, other agencies of government, and nongovernmental agencies, to anticipate and recognize change and take appropriate actions, and to set a tempo that meets expectations at home and retains the initiative abroad. Without the operational art, without learning the lessons of Beirut and Somalia, we court a repetition of defeat and failure.

1. Department of the Army, FM 100-5; Operations (Washington DC: US Govt Printing Office, 1993), p 6-2.
2. James J. Schneider, "Vulcan's Hammer: The American Civil War And The Emergence of Operational Art," (AMSP Publication, 16 June 1991), pp 39 -63. The US Army defines and describes the operational art in FM 100-5 but does not provide a model for use in an analysis of military operations distributed in terms of time and space. The army operational principles (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity) are also tactical principles (and also the principles of war). Similarly, the operational tenets of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility and operational dynamics of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership fail to distinguish between the tactical and operational levels.
3. The US Army more narrowly defines the term as "an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities: activities with a predominately diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding) and two complementary, predominately military activities (peacekeeping and peace enforcement). Department of the Army, FM 100-23; Peace Operations (Washington DC: US Govt Printing Office, 1994), p 111.
4. The other forms of peace operations, as defined by the US Army, are preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.
5. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations (Washington DC: US Govt Printing Office, 1994), p I-1.
6. The US Army definition of "peacekeeping" is exactly the same as that contained in Joint Publication 3-07.3.
7. FM 100-23, op cit, p 111.
8. Michael D. Malone, William H. Miller, Joseph W. Robben, "Lebanon: Lessons For Future Use Of American Forces In Peacekeeping" (National War College Strategic Studies Report, March 1985), p 9.
9. 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, "After Action Report For Beirut, Lebanon Operation, 29 Sep - 1 Nov 82" (12 November 1982), Section III.
10. J. R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn In Somalia" (Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 94), p 58. The U.S. limited the initial Somali mission in terms of mandate, time, and geographical scope. The stipulated operational objective was to stabilize the military situation only to the extent necessary to avert mass starvation. The expected duration of the effort was to be three or four months, after which UN forces would assume responsibility. Lastly, the relief effort would be limited only to those areas beset by starvation.

11. Ibid, p 62.
12. Michael Duffy, J. F. O. McAllister, Bruce van Voorst, "Anatomy Of A Disaster" (Time, 18 October 1993), p 46.
13. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p 75.
14. Major General Lewis McKenzie, Peacekeeper (Vancouver, Douglas and McIntyre, 1993), p 115. Throughout his tenure as the Commander, UN Protection Force In Bosnia from March to August 1992, McKenzie believed that trying to maintain impartially was the most difficult of his tasks. Each side of the conflict constantly sought ways to exploit the UN forces to its own benefit by conciliation, confrontation, or both. In peacekeeping, he noted that all sides firmly believed that they were on the righteous side and all sides were equally to blame at various times for disrupting the peace process.
15. Eric Hammel, The Root (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985) p 123.
16. DoD Commission On Beirut International Airport (BIA) Terrorist Act Of 23 October 1983, Chairman Admiral Robert L. J. Long USN (Ret), Report Of The DoD Commission On Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (U.S. Govt Printing Office: Washington DC, December 1983) p 59. Despite the representation of Druze and Moslem soldiers in the LAF, the LAF was treated with considerable suspicion by the Druze and Moslem populations. The popular perception was that the LAF was an instrument of the Maronite Phalange and that non-Phalange soldiers were either traitors, opportunists, or dupes of the Phalange.
17. Duffy, op cit, p 46.
18. Hammel, op cit, p 57.
19. Ibid, p 5.
20. Malone et al, op cit, p 20.
21. Long, op cit, p 74.
22. Ibid, p 42.
23. Deputy Prime Minister Boutros, Letter of 25 September 1982 as appended in Ramesh Thakur, International Peacekeeping In Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1987), pp 264-265.
24. Hammel, op cit, p 46.
25. Ibid, p

26. Long, op cit, p 74.
27. Bolton, op cit, p 62. The size of the Brigade differs from that reported by Louise Lief and Bruce Austerin, "What Went Wrong In Somalia?" (U.S. News And World Report, 18 October 1993), p 36. The size of the Brigade varied over time. The size quoted by Lief is a more accurate average.
28. Rick Atkinson, "The Raid That Went Wrong" (Washington Post, 30 Jan 94). The task of finding Aidid was initially conducted by UN forces in Somalia with limited QRF support. The Joint Special Operations Command, commanded by Major General Garrison, assumed this mission per an agreement between the Commander in Chief, Central Command, General Hoar, and the Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command, General Downing. Major General Montgomery, Commander of US Forces Somalia, was to support Major General Garrison in accomplishing his mission.
29. Steven A. Holmes, "U.S. Envoy Says Crackdown Strengthened Aidid's Faction" (New York Times International, December 1993).
30. Lief et al, op cit, p 36.
31. Rick Atkinson, "Night Of A Thousand Knives" (Washington Post, 31 January 1994).
32. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Officers Were Divided On Somali Raid" (New York Times International, 31 May 1994).
33. Atkinson, "The Raid That Went Wrong," op cit. Aidid's forces on 3 October did indeed have a plan for the ambush of US forces if they raided Aidid's staff meeting at the old Olympic Hotel in the middle of Aidid-controlled Bakara Market. The plan included the use of barrage fire with rocket propelled grenades to neutralize loitering helicopters, encirclement of the raid force using sheer weight of numbers to offset U.S. superior firepower, and the blocking/interdiction of any attempts to reinforce encircled forces with ground troops.
34. Long, op cit, p 41.
35. Duffy et al, op cit, p 46.
36. Lief et al, op cit, p 36.
37. Duffy et al, op cit, pp 46-47.
38. Long, op cit, p 45.
39. Hammel, op cit, p 82.

40. Long, op cit, p 38. Although the specific mission of keeping BIA open to public use was not directly included in any mission statement, the Marine Amphibious Unit Commander, charged with mission execution, identified this task as essential to maintaining a viable "presence" in the city. This task included the maintenance of free and open access to and normal operation of the airport.

41. Long, op cit, p 37.

42. Ibid, p 43.

43. Ibid.

44. Atkinson, "The Raid That Went Wrong," op cit. Airborne and electronic intelligence gathering assets proved to be of little use in locating a specific individual in a large city who made limited use of radio and telephone communications.

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